CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

ELECTIONS

-

STATE-MANDATED

CLOSED PRIMARY VIOLATES ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS OF POLIT-

PARTY AND ITS MEMBERS-Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Connecticut, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986).
ICAL

The American electoral process historically has implicated
several diverse liberty interests. Indeed, the freedom afforded to
Americans by the right of political association is "a necessary
guarantee against the tyranny of the majority."' At the same
time, "[i]t is clear that preservation of the integrity of the electoral process is a legitimate and valid state goal."' 2 These two ideals became the center of the conflict presented to the United
States Supreme Court in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.3 That controversy represented the first time a political party
challenged a state's closed primary law on first amendment
grounds.4 Specifically, the issue presented in Tashjian was
whether a state political party's first amendment right of political
association entitled that party to define its own associational
boundaries and structure.5 In upholding the lower courts, the
Supreme Court held that Connecticut's closed primary statute
impermissibly burdened a political party's first amendment
rights .6
The State of Connecticut adopted its present political primary system in 1955.' That system requires that each major
party8 hold a statewide convention of its delegates to select canI A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 194-95 (H. Reeve ed. 1984). See
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968) (first amendment freedom also "entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement
by the States.").
2 Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973).
3 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986).
4 Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 599 F. Supp. 1228,
1230 (D. Conn. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 544
(1986).
5 See Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265,
281 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986). The first amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 554.
7 Id. at 547.
8 A "major party" is statutorily defined as "a political party or organization
whose candidate for governor at the last-preceding election for governor re-
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didates for federal and state offices, and a district convention for
selection of candidates for the state legislature.9 The candidates
ultimately selected by the major parties are automatically placed
on the general election ballot.' 0 When primary elections are necessary, their costs are paid out of public funds."
The Republican Party of Connecticut (the Party), a major
party under Connecticut law, is a collection of individuals who
"associate for the common advancement of political beliefs and
ideas."' 2 To forward this objective, the Party attempts to nominate candidates with the "broadest spectrum of popular support"
or, in other words, those who appear most likely to prevail at the
general elections.' 3 For a long time, however, the Connecticut
Republican Party did not enjoy great success at the polls.'

4

In

addition, both registered Democratic voters and registered but
unaffiliated voters far outnumbered registered Republican voters
in the state. 15 In August 1983, the State Central Committee of
the Republican Party appointed a subcommittee to study the existing rules of the Party, and to devise a strategy in order to enceived.. .at least twenty per cent of the whole number of votes cast for all candidates for governor." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-372(5)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
Under this definition, the Democratic and Republican parties are the only major
parties in Connecticut. Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 547 n.2.
9 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 547. Under this system, any person who receives more
than 20% of the votes cast at a roll-call vote at the convention may be certified as a
party-endorsed candidate. The endorsed candidate may be challenged in a primary
election by any unendorsed candidate who has also received more than 20% of the
vote. The candidate receiving the plurality of votes in the primary election will
become the nominee of the party. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-382 (West
1966), 9-400, 9-444 (West Supp. 1987).
10 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-379 (West Supp. 1987).
11 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 547. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-441 (West
1966) (compensation for registrars and municipal clerks paid by municipality).
12 Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 268
(2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986).
13

Id. at 269.

Id. From 1958 to 1984, the Republican Party captured just four of 16 statewide elections for Governor and United States Senator. During the same period,
the Party prevailed in only 25 of 84 elections for United States Representative. Id.
at 269 n.4 (citing State of Connecticut Register and Manual 72-82 (1983); 42 Cong.
Q. 2923 (Nov. 10, 1984)).
'5 Id. at 269 n.4 (citing The Hartford Courant, Jan. 4, 1985, at A6). When this
action was commenced, Connecticut had 659,268 registered Democrats, 532,723
registered but unaffiliated voters, and 425,695 registered Republicans. Tashjian,
107 S. Ct. at 547 n.3. In August 1985, there were 718,772 registered Democrats,
608,613 registered but unaffiliated voters, and 477,749 registered Republicans in
the State of Connecticut. M. BARONE & G. UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN
14

POLITICS

1986, 237 (1985).
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sure a likelihood of future electoral success. 16 Eventually, the
subcommittee decided that the Party's chances at the general
elections would improve if unaffiliated voters were allowed to
participate in the Republican primary elections. 17 The subcommittee believed that such participation would not only ensure
that candidates with greater bipartisan support were nominated,
but also would involve registered but unaffiliated voters to a
greater extent in these elections. 8 In September 1983, the Central Committee recommended calling a convention to consider
implementation of the subcommittee's suggestion. 19
On January 14, 1984, the delegates to the state Republican
Convention approved an amendment to its party rules (the Party
Rule) which permitted unaffiliated individuals to vote in Republican Party primaries.2" The Party Rule, however, directly contravened the closed primary law encompassed in § 9-431 of the
Connecticut General Statutes which prevented registered but unaffiliated voters from voting in any party primary. 2 ' As a result,
Republican legislators attempted to amend § 9-431 during the
1984 session of the Connecticut General Assembly. 22 Represen16 See Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265,
269 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986).
17 See id.
18 See id. An open primary "allows relatively independent voters to cast their lot
with the party that speaks to their present concerns. By attracting participation by
relatively independent-minded voters, the [open primary] arguably may enlarge the
support for a party at the general election." Democratic Party of the United States
v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 132-33 (1981) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
19 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 547.
20 See Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265,
269 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986). The Party Rule provided that
"[a]ny elector enrolled as a member of the Republican Party and any elector not
enrolled as a member of a party shall be eligible to vote in primaries for nomination
of candidates for the offices of United States Senator, United States Representative,
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, Comptroller
and Treasurer." Id. The Party Rule would not affect qualifications for voting in
other Republican Party primary elections, such as those for seats in the Connecticut
State Senate and House of Representatives. See id. at 269 n.5.
21 Id. at 269-70. Section 9-431 provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be
permitted to vote at a primary of a party unless he is on the last-completed enrolment [sic] list of such party in the municipality or voting district ..
" CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 9-431 (West Supp. 1987).
22 See Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265,
270 (2d Cir. 1985), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986). If amended, § 9-431 would have
provided, in pertinent part: "EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY STATE
PARTY RULES, no person shall be permitted to vote at a primary of a party unless
he is on the last-completed enrollment list of such party in the municipality or voting district ..
" Id. at 270.
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tative Mae Schmidle introduced a bill (the Schmidle bill) which
was referred to the Committee on Governmental Administration
and General Elections.23 On February 28, 1984, Albert Lenge,
the Director and Elections Attorney in the Office of the Secretary
of State, testified before the Committee that implementation of
the Party Rule would be "workable. ' 24 Despite this testimony,
the Schmidle bill was unable to overcome strong Democratic opposition in the General Assembly.25
Republican legislators next attempted to implement the provisions of the Party Rule through two amendments to a bill concerning time limits upon enrollment of unaffiliated voters.2 6 On
April 11, 1984, both amendments were convincingly defeated in
the Connecticut House of Representatives, substantially along
party lines.2 7 One week later, in similar partisan fashion, the
Connecticut Senate voted down an amendment containing the
provisions of the Schmidle bill.28 Confronted with the futility of
attempting to implement the Party Rule through the legislative
process, the Republicans turned instead to the courts.2 9
23 See id.

24 See id.
25 See id.
On March 7, 1984, the Committee on Governmental Administration
and Elections voted 13 to 8 against the Schmidle Bill. The Committee
further voted 12 to 9 against reporting the bill out of committee with an
unfavorable report, thereby preventing the proposed legislation from
being considered by the entire General Assembly. On March 15, the
Committee reconsidered its earlier vote and reported unfavorably on
the bill to the [Connecticut] House of Representatives, indicating the
Committee's opposition. Burdened with an unfavorable report, the bill
languished in the House and was never presented for a vote.
Id. at 270 n.6.
26 See id. at 270. These amendments provided that "[wihere state party rules so
provide, an elector whose name does not appear on any enrollment list shall be
entitled to vote in a primary conducted by such party for nomination for election to
the office of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of the state, treasurer, comptroller, attorney general, senator or representative." Id.
27 See id. At the time of the vote, the Democrats enjoyed an 87 to 63 edge over
Republicans in the Connecticut House of Representatives. The first amendment
considered was defeated by a count of 92 to 54, with all 83 Democrats who cast
votes opposing the bill. The second amendment considered was voted down 93 to
54, with Democrats voting 85 to zero against passage. See id. at 270 n.7.
28 See id. at 270. The amendment was opposed by all 23 Democratic senators,
and supported by all 13 Republican senators. See id.
29 Id. The Republican Party had taken control of the State Senate (24-12) and
the State House of Representatives (85-66) as a result of the 1984 elections. M.
BARONE & G. UJIFUSA, supra note 15, at 237. However, Connecticut Governor William A. O'Neill, a Democrat, had promised to veto any legislation that would lead
to implementation of the Party Rule. Republican Party of the State of Connecticut
v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 270 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S.Ct. 544 (1986) (cit-
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On May 10, 1984, the Party and four other plaintiffs instituted an action in the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut.3 ° The Party alleged that § 9-431 infringed its
first and fourteenth amendment right to associate for the advancement of common political objectives, and, accordingly,
sought to enjoin its continued application as unconstitutional. 3 1
Applying the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court,3 2
the district court recognized that the statute should only be upheld if it advanced legitimate state interests and if, in advancing
these interests, it did so in a way that least restricted 3the Party's
ability to shape freely its candidate selection process. 3
In response to the Party's allegations, the State of Connecticut maintained that § 9-431 only incidentally burdened the
Party's right of political association; hence, the statute need only
be rationally related to the advancement of a legitimate state interest to be upheld.34 The State also asserted that the Party Rule
violated the United States Constitution by permitting unaffiliated
voters to partake in primary elections for congressional seats
while denying them the right to vote in primary elections for the
Connecticut legislature.35
ing The Hartford Courant, Jan. 4, 1985, at 1). Governor O'Neill upheld his promise on June 28, 1985, by vetoing Senate Bill No. 5, Public Act No. 85-320, which
would have allowed unaffiliated voters to participate in certain primary elections.
Id.
30 Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 270
n.8 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986). The other plaintiffs named in the
complaint were Thomas J. D'Amore, J., chairman of the Connecticut Republican
State Central Committee, and the State Party's principal elected officeholders on
the federal level: United States Senator Lowell P. Weicker and United States Representatives Stewart R. McKinney and Nancy L. Johnson. Id. The named defendant was Connecticut Secretary of State, Julia H. Tashjian, who in that capacity was
responsible for administration of § 9-431. Id.
31 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 548.
32 See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975) (state's interest must be
compelling in order to justify abridgment of Party's exercise of constitutionally protected right of association). See also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
33 Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 599 F. Supp. 1228,
1231 (D. Conn. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 544
(1986).
34 Id. at 1236.
35 The state specifically referred to the Qualifications Clauses of Article I, § 2
and the seventeenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Article I, § 2
provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year by the People of the several states, and the Electors
in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the
most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
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On December 5, 1984, the district court granted the Republican Party's motion for summary judgment and denied the
State's motion to dismiss the complaint. 6 The court found that
§ 9-431 substantially interfered with the Party's first amendment
right of political association, 7 and that the State's purported justifications in support of its mandatory closed primary were not
compelling. 38 The district court thus held that "[the] party's decision to permit unaffiliated voters to participate in its primaries
[was] constitutionally permitted.13 9 Accordingly, the district
court enjoined enforcement of § 9-431 as applied to the Party
Rule.40
On August 8, 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.4 '
Circuit Judge Irving R. Kaufman opined that no constitutional
impediment to the Party Rule existed4 2 and that, absent compelling interests, the function of the selection of candidates by a
political party is a matter properly for the party and not the
state.43
On December 10, 1986, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the lower courts and held that the
state's enforcement of its closed primary system, as implemented
through § 9-431, was an impermissible burden on the first and
fourteenth amendment rights of the Republican Party and its
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2. The seventeenth amendment provides, in pertinent part:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State, elected by the People thereof, for six years; and each Senator
shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State
legislatures.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. The seventeenth amendment was styled after Article I,
§ 2, and the two are interpreted similarly. See Phillips v. Rockefeller, 435 F.2d 976,
979 (3d Cir. 1971).
36 Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 599 F. Supp. 1228,
1241 (D. Conn. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1985), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 544
(1986).
37 Id. at 1241. The district court explained that § 9-431 had allowed Connecticut's legislature to "substitute its judgment for that of the party on ... the question
of who is and [who] is not sufficiently allied in interest with the party to warrant
inclusion in its candidate selection process .. " Id. at 1238.
38 Id. The interests offered by the state were the prevention of raiding, the
avoidance of voter confusion, and the promotion of a stable two-party system. Id.
39 Id. at 1231.
40 Id.
41 Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 286
(2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S.Ct. 544 (1986).
42 Id. at 274-75.
43 Id. at 281.
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members.44 The Court also deemed that the interests asserted
by the state in defense of the statute were insubstantial. 45 The
Court also rejected the State's claim that implementation of the
Party Rule violated the clauses in Article I, § 2 and the seventeenth amendment to the United States Constitution pertaining
to voter qualifications for federal and state elections (the Qualifications Clauses).46
Although the text of the United States Constitution does not
expressly provide for the right of freedom of association, a series
of relatively recent Supreme Court opinions has recognized such
a right as implicit in the several provisions of the first amendment. 47 Two distinct aspects of the associational right have been
recognized in these opinions-one individualistic and one collective.48 While a number of earlier cases upheld an individual's
right to associate on a transient basis 4 9-for "quasi-associational" acts 50-the right to associate formally became a right of
constitutional dimensions in the 1958 decision of NAACP v. Ala44

Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 556-57.

45

Id.

Id. at 556.
See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S.
51 (1973); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). For an
analysis of these opinions, see infra notes 51-88 and accompanying text.
48 E.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In discussing the
development of the dual nature of the right of freedom of association, the Roberts
Court observed that:
In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured
against undue intrusion by the State .... In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.
In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate
for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances,
and the exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of
association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other
individual liberties .... [W]hen the State interferes with individuals' selection of those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor,
freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated.
Id. at 617-18. See also Note, Primary Elections and the Right of Freedom of Association, 94
YALE L.J. 117, 122 (1984) (right of freedom of association has both individualistic
and collective aspects).
49 E.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (as applied to parade);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (demonstration); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937) (holding of public meeting).
50 See Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265,
276 n.19 (2d Cir. 1985), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986) (Court afforded first amendment protection to these activities).
46
47
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bama ex rel. Patterson.5 ' At issue in NAACP was the validity of an
Alabama statutory requirement that the NAACP disclose its
membership list in that state to the Attorney General of Alabama. 52 The argument advanced by the NAACP was that the
statutory requirement would result in a substantial restraint upon
the right of the members to exercise their freedom of association.5 3 Accepting the NAACP's position, the Court unanimously
held that the NAACP could not be compelled to disclose the
names and addresses of its members and agents in Alabama.5 4
Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan declared that the independent right of association was constitutionally protected through
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 5 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged the "vital relationship between
the freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations"-the
individual aspect of the associational right.5 6 The Court also observed the existence of the collective aspect of the right-namely,
that the protection of privacy in group associations might, in
many circumstances, be essential for the protection of freedom of
association, "particularly where a group espouse[d] dissident beliefs." ' 5 7 Addressing the ability of an association to advocate the
beliefs of its members, the Court asserted that an association
might be able to attain objectives that are different in quality
from those attainable by individuals.5 8 Thus, the Court implicitly
recognized that dual aspects of the associational right enabled
individuals and associations alike to avail themselves of first
amendment protection.5 9
Ten years after the NAACP Court articulated the contours of
the associational right, a series of decisions transformed political
51 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
52 Id. at 453.
53 Id. at 462.
54 Id. at 466.
55 Id. at 460. See also Note, supra note 48, at 122.
56 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. The Court has subsequently applied the individual
aspect of freedom of association to various types of intimate relationships as a major component of individual liberty. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-85
(1978) (right of privacy protects personal decisions such as right to marry); Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977) (freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life-as applied here to educating children-is protected
liberty); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977) (co-habitation with relatives is matter deserving constitutional recognition).
57 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
58 Id. at 463. The collective right referred to the ability of NAACP members "to
pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs .. " Id.
59 See id. at 462-66. See also Note, supra note 48, at 122-23 (association is protected by Constitution in carrying out members' first amendment activities).
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association "from abstract theory into an effective right." ' 60 The
Supreme Court first addressed the right of political association in
the 1968 case of Williams v. Rhodes.6 In Williams, the Court reviewed a challenge to the Ohio election laws. 62 These laws provided that, in order to be placed on the general election ballot,
new political parties had to file nominating petitions signed by
fifteen per cent of the registered voters in the last gubernatorial
election.63 In Williams, the plaintiff party did satisfy the numerical
requirement, but it did not do so by the date specified in the election law; hence, the party was barred from inclusion on the
ballot. 64
The Court reviewed its traditional protection of associational freedom,6 5 and concluded that the statutory scheme at issue burdened individuals' rights for the advancement of political
ideas. 6 6 The Williams Court reasoned that new political parties
would be seriously disadvantaged by the statutory scheme and
that established parties would benefit-an effect that would result
in "substantially unequal burdens on both the right to vote and
the right to associate." '6 7 The Court further commented that
"[t]he right to form a party for the advancement of political goals
means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus
denied an opportunity to win votes."' 68 Utilizing the fourteenth
amendment to apply the first amendment's protection of associational rights from infringement by the states, 69 the Williams
60 See Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265,
278 (2d Cir. 1985), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986). The court of appeals summarized
this transformation, explaining that "[blecause political advocacy and participation
in partisan politics are lodged at the heart of the first amendment, freedom of association necessarily includes a right of political association. Concomitantly, freedom
of association protects the right to form a political party for the advancement of
partisan political beliefs." Id.
61 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
62 Id. at 24.
63 Id. at 24-25. This requirement, along with substantial additional burdens,
made it very unlikely that any party would qualify on the ballot except for the Republican and Democratic parties, which had much easier requirements to satisfy.
Id. at 25-26. For a list of the additional statutory burdens, see id. at 25 n. 1.
64 Id. at 26-27.
65 See id. at 30-31.
66 Id. at 34.
67 Id. at 31. In striking down a law that gave a virtual monopoly to the Republicans and Democrats, the Court, however, did not denigrate mere promotion of the
"two-party system." Id. at 32. Such promotion is advanced in Tashjian as a compelling state interest. See infra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
68 Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
69 The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part:
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Court struck down the Ohio election law. 70
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided both Rosario v. Rockefeller 7 1 and Kusper v. Pontikes.72 In these cases, the Court examined
the constitutionality of durational affiliation requirements.73 In
so doing, the Court turned its attention to individuals seeking to
vote in primary elections. 4 In Rosario, the Court addressed the
validity of a New York statute that required individuals who
wanted to vote in a particular party's primary to register with that
party thirty days prior to the preceding general election.75 The
petitioners had been barred from voting in the 1972 presidential
primary because they failed to register before the cutoff date in
1971 .76 The Rosario Court rejected the petitioner's challenge to
the statute and held that the statute at issue "did not constitute a
ban on their freedom of association, but merely a time limitation
on when they had to act in order to participate in their chosen
party's next primary." '77 Applying a minimal level of scrutiny to
the statute, the Court ruled that the legitimate state interest in
preventing party raiding outweighed the burden of having to
comply with the time limitation.78
The Kusper Court, however, refused to uphold a similar durational affiliation requirement, striking down an Illinois statute
that prevented persons from voting in a party primary if they had
participated in the primary of another party within the preceding
twenty-three months. 7' The Court noted that "freedom to assoNo State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
70 Williams, 393 U.S. at 34-35. While the Court also found that the Ohio laws
constituted a violation of the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection clause, id.
at 34, Justice Harlan based his concurrence solely on the first amendment right to
political association. See id. at 41-48 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
72 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
73 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIUTIONAL LAw § 13-24, at 791 (1978).
74 Id.
75 Rosario, 410 U.S. at 754.
76 Id. at 755. The cutoff date in 1971 was October 2, but the plaintiff did not
register until early December 1971. Id. None of the petitioners offered an explanation for their failure to make a timely enrollment. Id. at 755 n.4.
77 Id. at 758.
78 See id. at 760-61. "Raiding" is the practice "whereby voters in sympathy with
one part designate themselves as voters of another party so as to influence or determine the results of the other party's primary. Id. at 760.
79 See Kusper, 414 U.S. at 52-53, 61.
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ciate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs
and ideas" was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.8 0 The Court also found that the aggrieved voter was impermissibly bound by statute to a party although she no longer
wished to be.8 ' The Court distinguished its holding in Kusper
from Rosano stating that "[u]nlike the petitioners in Rosario,
whose disenfranchisement was caused by their own failure to take
timely measures to enroll, there was no action that [the plaintiff]
could have taken to make herself eligible to vote in the 1972
Democratic primary. "82 The Kusper Court concluded that while
the statute did not absolutely preclude the plaintiff from associating with the party of her choice, it did deny her a voice in the
selection of candidates for public office-a prime objective of
most voters in choosing to associate themselves with a particular
party.8 3
In 1978, the Supreme Court again articulated and strengthened the right of political association in Cousins v. Wigoda."4 In
Cousins, the Supreme Court examined the conflict between party
rules and their regulation by the state.8 5 The appeal to the
Supreme Court stemmed from an appellate court's decision to
uphold an order preventing the 1972 Democratic National Convention from replacing certain delegates.8 6 The election of the
delegates whom the Democratic party sought to replace was valid
under Illinois law but violated a Democratic party rule.87 In reversing the appellate court's ruling, the Supreme Court reasoned
that the injunction served no compelling state interest that could
"justify the injunction's abridgement" of the rights held by the
petitioners and the National Democratic Party.88
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84
85
86

at
at
at
at

56-57.

57.
60.
58.
419 U.S. 477 (1978).
Id. at 487-89.
Id. at 479-82.

87 Id.
88 Id. at 489 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)). Cousins has
recently been analyzed as follows:
Although the ratio decidendi of the case was that a state possesses a meager interest in preserving the integrity of a national nominating convention, the Court's language suggests that it is the party that has an
associational interest in deciding who may participate in its activities.
Indeed, the opinion suggests that a party's right to associate may even
protect a more generalized right of group self-governance.
Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 279 (2d
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In deciding this recent series of cases, the Supreme Court
has attempted to reconcile the "tensions among a political party's
right to self-determination [with] an individual's right to participate in primary elections and the state's interest in regulating
such elections."' 9 The interest of an individual in the right to
vote in primary elections was considered in Nader v. Schaffer.9 ° In
Nader, the plaintiffs were unaffiliated voters who wanted to vote
in Republican primaries against the wishes of the Connecticut
Republican Party. 91 They brought a challenge against the State
of Connecticut's closed primary law, and the district court refused to recognize the existence of an explicit right to vote in
primary elections. 92 Accordingly, the district court upheld the
provisions of the Connecticut General Statutes governing primary elections." Justifying its determination, the court noted
that "party members are entitled to affirmative protection of
their associational rights" 94 and that the state may legislate to
protect the party "from intrusion by those with adverse political
principles." 5
A state's assertion of its interest in the electoral process was
presented in the 1981 case of Democratic Party of United States v.
Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette.9 6 When the National Democratic Party
(National Party) objected to a state-mandated open primary because it included voters who lacked the right to participate in the
primary election, the state of Wisconsin brought an action
against the National Party for its refusal to sit the Wisconsin delegation. 97 This delegation had been chosen under a selection sysCir. 1985), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986) (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477,
490-91 (1978)).
89 Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 279
(2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S.Ct. 544 (1986). See also Note, supra note 48, at 117 (if
federal courts are to establish doctrine concerning state regulation of who may participate in primary elections, it must be able to resolve challenges from individual
voters, the state, and the political party).
90 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn.), aff'd mem., 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
91 Id. at 840.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 850.
94 Id. at 845. See also Note, Primary Elections: The Real Party in Interest, 27 RUTGERS
L. REV. 298, 304 (1974) (associational right does not exist if group's aims diverge
greatly from those of individual).
95 Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 845 (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221-22
(1952)). The district court's disposition of Nader indicates that associational rights
do not extend to independent voters who are excluded from a primary. Note, supra
note 48, at 118.
96 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
97 Id. at 114-15. See also Note, supra note 48, at 118.
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tem that expressly violated the rules of the National Democratic
Party.98
Addressing the Democratic Party controversy, the Supreme
Court framed the issue as whether the state could force the National Party, a national political organization, to accept a delegation at its convention that was chosen in a way that violated Party
rules. 99 Ultimately, the Court answered this question in the negative.100 The Court held that a political party's freedom of association had to include the freedom to determine the scope of the
association and the concomitant ability to restrict its membership. 10 ' While the state claimed "a compelling interest in preserving the overall integrity of the electoral process, providing
secrecy of the ballot, increasing voter participation in primaries,
and preventing harassment of voters, ' '1 ° 2 the Court nonetheless
held that the substantial intrusion into the National Party's asso0 3
ciational freedom was not justified.1
As a result of the decisions in Nader and Democratic Party,
political parties may successfully assert the right of freedom of
political association in order to conduct its internal affairs free
from the input of others. In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, however, the Republican Party determined to expand the
right of freedom of political association to include nonmembers
in its primary selection process, but was prevented from doing so
10
by the state.

4

98 Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 112-13. The National Party held that only those
persons who made a public declaration of affiliation to the Democratic Party could
participate in the selection of delegates to the National Convention. Id. at 109.
Wisconsin election laws, however, included no such requirement. Id.
99 Id. at 121.
100 Id. at 126. The Democratic Party Court cited as controlling precedent the holding of the Cousins Court that "[a state's] interest in protecting the integrity of its
electoral process cannot be deemed compelling in the context of the selection of
delegates to the National Party Convention." Id. at 121 (citing Cousins v. Wigoda,
419 U.S. 477, 491 (1978)). Like Cousins, Democratic Party concerned "the binding
effect of [state] law on the freedom of the national party to define its own eligibility
standards." Id. at 123 n.24.
101 Id. at 122. One author has observed that "[flreedom of association would
prove an empty guarantee if associations could not limit control over their decisions to those who share the interests and persuasions that underlie the association's being." Id. at 122 n.22 (quoting L. TRIBE, supra note 73, at 791).
102

Id. at 124-25.

Id. at 125-26. The Court declared that "the stringency and wisdom of membership requirements is for the association and its members to decide." Id. at 123
n.25.
104 See Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 549 n.6.
103
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Justice Marshall, writing for the Tashjian majority,' 5 began
his analysis by reviewing the applicable standard of review when
examining the constitutionality of a specific provision of a state
election law.10 6 The Justice asserted that, first, a court must evaluate the character and magnitude of an' alleged injury to first and
fourteenth amendment rights.' 0 7 Next, a court must identify and
assess the proffered state interest which seeks to justify the burden imposed by the law.' 0 8 Finally, Justice Marshall stated that
"the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength
of each of these interests, it must also consider the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's
rights."' 0 9 The Tashjian Court, addressing the Republican
Party's claim of injury, noted that political organizations are undeniably encompassed within the associatiOnal right protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments, and declared that the
Party's attempts "to broaden the base of public participation in
and support for its activities" was central to its exercise of the
associational right.' 0
The Court perceived that the Connecticut closed primary
statute placed limits upon the group of registered voters that the
Party could potentially invite to participate in the candidate selection process."' The Court declared that, from the Republican
Party's perspective, the formal act of enrollment or affiliation
with the Party was but one manifestation of Party involvement,
and not necessarily the most important." 2 The Court explained
that a political party may rely upon many individuals performing
different roles and tasks such as the furthering of political or organizational goals, providing substantial financial support, or
105 Id. at 546. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, was joined by Justices
Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Powell. Id. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Scalia joined. Id. Justice Scalia also filed a dissenting opinion
in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined. Id.
106

Id. at 548.

Id. (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (quoting Storer
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
107

108 Id.
109 Id.

l0 Id. at 549.
111 Id.
112 Id. Justice Marshall reasoned that, under circumstances in which public
knowledge of one's affiliation with a political organization might subject that person to public hostility or discrimination, such an association would have a constitutional right to protect the privacy of its membership rolls. Id. at 549 n.5 (citing
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 462 (1958)).

1987]

NOTES

885

simply voting for some or all of the Party's candidates." 3 It hypothesized that if the state were to statutorily require Party membership as a prerequisite for making a campaign contribution, or
to limit the Party's pool of prospective nominees for public office
to Party members, the resulting prohibition of nonmembers from
potential association with members would infringe upon party
members' rights "to organize with like-minded citizens in support of common political goals."" ' 4 Accordingly, the majority
concluded that the Republican Party's opportunities for association were limited "at the crucial juncture at which the appeal to
common principles may be translated into concerted
action, and
' 5
hence to political power in the community." "
The Tashjian Court next acknowledged that the states have a
broad constitutional power to prescribe the "Times, Places, and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,''116 together with the power already retained by the states
to regulate elections for state offices." 7 The majority also asserted, however, that such authority did not permit the state to
disregard the limits imposed by the first amendment upon the
authority it might exercise over its citizens." 8 The Court posited
that the state's power to regulate the time, place and manner of
elections, by itself, did not justify the abridgement of a fundamental right such as the right to vote or the freedom of political
association.1 19
Id.
Id. The Court noted its comment in an earlier case that " '[a]ny interference
with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of
its adherents.' " Id. (citing Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450
U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957)).
115 Id. at 549-50. The State argued that a recently implemented amendment to
§ 9-56 of the Connecticut General Statutes, permitting unaffiliated voters to register with a party until the last business day preceding the primary election, made any
infringement upon the Republican Party's associational rights de minimuts. Id. at 550
n.7. In rejecting this contention, however, the majority noted that the Party was
still powerless to increase its associational opportunities through an act of its own.
Id. Moreover, the State's requirement, as interpreted by the Court, required the
public action of affiliation, regardless of a voter's actual belief, in order to permit an
exercise of the associational right. Id.; cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15
(1977).
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
117 Tashjian, 107 S.Ct. at 550.
''3
114

118

Id.

119 Id. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964) (right to vote is too important to allow interpretation of Article I, § 4 to immunize state congressional apportionment laws from judicial review).
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The Court next considered each of the interests offered by
the State of Connecticut in its attempt to justify the closed primary statute's burden on the first amendment right at issue.' 2
The state contended that § 9-431 was narrowly tailored, and that
it advanced the compelling interests of the state."' The state
first forwarded the argument that the administrative burden imposed upon the state by the Party Rule was sufficient to justify the
continued enforcement of § 9-431.122 The state specifically declared that the Party Rule would require it to purchase extra voting machines, train additional poll workers, and possibly print
additional ballot materials for the benefit of individuals voting in
a Republican primary. Accordingly, the state asserted that the
implementation of the Party Rule would be too costly.' 23 The

Court rejected this claim, even under the presumption that the
state's contentions were accurate. 124 The majority drew an analogy between increased costs stemming from implementation of
the Party Rule, and a similar increase which would occur if a third
major party were to arise in Connecticut, thereby requiring a
third party primary. 25 The Court emphasized that the state
could not use increased administrative costs as a pretext for
maintaining only two major parties. 26 Similarly, the Court determined that the state could not cite administrative convenience
to justify restraint
upon the Republican Party's freedom of
1 27
association.

The Court next assessed the merits of the state's purported
interest in preventing party raiding through the statute.12 8 While
acknowledging that the concern regarding raiding was legitimate
in some contexts, the Court found little merit in the state's position. 129 The Court reasoned that the state's present closed primary law did not impede a raid on the Republican Party by
independent voters, as independents could simply register as
120 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 550.
121 Id.

122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 551.

125 Id. For a discussion of major parties in Connecticut, see supra notes 8-11 and
accompanying text.
126 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 551; cf. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
127 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 551.

The Court did, however, intone that the state

might take administrative and financial concerns into account in deciding whether
to have a party system. Id.
128 Id. See supra note 78 (definition of raiding).
129

Id.
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Republicans and vote in the primary. I "° Indeed, the Court noted
t
that the amendment found in § 9-56 I"
of the Connecticut Gen-

eral Statutes actually facilitated such raiding by independents,
and accordingly, dismissed the alleged interest in party raiding as
an inadequate justification for enforcement of § 9-431.12
The appellant next proffered its interest in preventing voter
confusion.'1 The state contended that the public would have
difficulty understanding a candidate's true position when that
candidate was nominated by anyone other than a Party member.'" 4 In response, the Court agreed that the state does have a
valid interest in "informed and educated expressions of the popular will," but opined that case law "reflect[s] a greater faith in
the ability of individual voters to inform themselves about campaign issues. ' 13 5 The majority also criticized the state's argument, in support of this purported interest, that the Party Rule
interfered with educated decision-making by voters. 136 The
Court theorized that in Connecticut the question of how to attract the state's large group of independent voters was of legitimate concern to the Republican Party. 13 7 The Tashjian Court
noted that the Party's decision to invite independents to select
among its primary candidates was their chosen method to
achieve this goal.13 While the state claimed that the closed primary statute avoided voter confusion, the Court considered this
argument to be a deprivation of an opportunity by the Party to
ascertain how much support its candidates have among a considerable portion of the electorate. 139 The Court concluded that the
130 Id. The Court also commented that the hypothetical raiding situation with
which the state was concerned was a "curious concept only distantly related to the
type of raiding discussed in Kusper and Rosario." Id.
131 In Connecticut, any unaffiliated elector who wishes to vote in a party's primary may do so by making a written and signed application for enrollment in that
party, no later than twelve noon on the last business day before the primary. See
CONN. GEN. STAr. ANN. § 9-56 (West Supp. 1987).
132 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 551.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 552 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796 (1983)). In
rejecting the state's contention, the court of appeals had previously declared that
this so-called "interest" would effectively encourage voters to engage in "unthinking and Pavlovian reliance on party labels." Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 284 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986).
136 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 552.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. The Tashjian Court observed that "[a] State's claim that it is enhancing the
ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information
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state's interest in both preventing voter confusion and ensuring
the existence of an informed electorate did not necessitate the
burden imposed by § 9-431.140
The state's final contention was that § 9-431 "furthers the
State's compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the twoparty system and the responsibility of party government." 141
The majority noted that no consensus had yet emerged vis-a-vis
the relative merits of open and closed primaries. 4 2 Furthermore, the Court declined to second-guess either the state legislature in enacting the closed primary system in 1955, or the
14 3
Republican Party in attempting to depart from it.
The Court
posited that the legitimate protection a state affords its party system is for the purpose of preventing the parties from disruptions
from the outside, not to prevent parties from affecting their own
candidate selection process.' 44 The majority completed its discussion of this purported state interest by stressing that a party's
determination of its own associational boundaries and structure
is protected by the first amendment, and may not be interfered
with by a state or court which "view[s] a particular expression as
unwise or irrational."' 145 Accordingly, the Court held that none
of the interests proffered as compelling by the state, which to a
to them must be viewed with some skepticism." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 798 (1983)).
140 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 552.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 553. A brief to the court of appeals compared the two types of primaries. For example, a closed primary may be preferable when a party perceives a
need to clarify its policies and make them clearly distinguishable from those of rival
parties. Brief of Amici Curiae (political scientists) Seeking Affirmance at 6, Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1985),
aff'd, 107 S.Ct. 544 (1986) (citing V.0. KEY, AMERICAN STATE POLITICS 165-96
(1956)). Such a primary and nomination process will be shaped by a party's socalled "true believers", and will present the general electorate with a clear (and
sometimes extreme) ideological choice. Id. at 6-7 (citing W. GOODMAN, THE PARTY
SYSTEM IN AMERICA 183-228 (1980)).
On the other hand, an open primary presents a broader scope that is an appropriate choice when seeking either to increase competition in the face of one-party
dominance, or present a more moderate position as an alternative to an extremist
ideology. A relatively greater segment of the public participates in such political
decisionmaking. Id. at 7 (citing Crotty, In Favor of the Status Quo, in PRESIDENTIAL
SELECTION 15 (F. Havelick ed. 1981)). "[Tlhere is a time and a place for different
strategies regarding who should vote in a primary and therefore how the party's
political agenda will be shaped." Id. at 6.
143 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 553.
144 Id. at 553-54.
145 Id. at 554 (citing Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S.
107, 124 (1981)).
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degree represented the interests of the political party then in the
majority, justified continued enforcement of § 9-431.146

The majority next addressed the state's claim that the Party
Rule, by its terms, was unconstitutional.147 The state's argument
centered on the qualifications clauses of Article I, § 2, and the
seventeenth amendment of the United States Constitution (the
Qualifications Clauses). 4 ' This objection to the Party Rule was
based on its establishment of differing voter qualifications for
federal and state legislative offices.' 49 In analyzing this contention, the Court first determined whether the qualifications
clauses applied to primaries as well as general elections. 50 The
Court asserted that it was not possible for the Framers to have
contemplated the effects of the Qualifications Clauses on the
modern primary system.' 51 The majority added, however, that
the Constitution was designed to address then unforeseeable developments in human affairs, while carrying out the "fundamental purposes" espoused in that document. 152 The Tashjian Court
described the fundamental purpose of the provisions regarding
voter qualifications as applying to the entire process for the selection of federal legislators.'
Justice Marshall opined that a
state's decision to integrate the primary into its electoral process
Id.
Id. at 554-55.
See supra note 35 for the language of these two constitutional provisions.
Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 554. The Party Rule permitted independents to vote in
primaries to determine United States Senators and Representatives, but was silent
with regard to primary voter qualifications for state legislative seats. Appellant argued that the Qualifications Clauses required "absolute symmetry of qualifications ..
" Id. at 554-55. See also supra note 20 (language of Party Rule).
150 See Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 555. The majority acknowledged that the court of
appeals rejected appellant's argument outright, and held that the provisions did
not apply to primary elections. Id. (citing Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 274 (2d Cir. 1985)). The concurrence viewed the
issue differently, analyzing the provision as only requiring that anyone permitted to
vote for seats in the more numerous state legislative branch must be made eligible
to vote in elections for United States Congress. Id. (citing Republican Party, 770
F.2d at 286 (Oakes,J., concurring)). The majority expressed its agreement with the
latter interpretation. Id. at 555.
'5' Id.
152 Id. As the Court noted in an earlier case:
[1]n determining whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a
new subject matter, it is of little significance that it is one with which the
framers were not familiar. For in setting up an enduring framework of
government they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in
all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental
purposes which the instrument itself discloses.
Id. (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315-16 (1941)).
153 Id.
146

147
148
149
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effectively made the requirements of Article I, § 2 and the seventeenth amendment applicable to that primary as well.' 5 4 The
Court thus held that the Qualifications Clauses applied to primary elections just as they did to general elections. 155
The majority continued its consideration of the Qualifications Clauses with an examination of Article I, § 2, and the purpose of the framers in enacting it. 156 The majority explained that
the different states represented at the constitutional convention
already had their respective voter qualification provisions in
place.' 5 7 The Court explained that the framers feared that a uniform federal voter qualification would have disenfranchised some
previously eligible state voters. 5 ' As James Madison would later
observe, the language of the first Qualifications Clause appeased
every state, allowing each to establish the qualifications by which
its resident voters could participate in both state and federal elections."' The Tashjian Court noted that the provision was not intended to limit the availability of the federal franchise, but
instead was implemented to preclude problems that would arise
if state voters were barred from federal elections. 160 The majority opined that this objective did not, therefore, require "absolute symmetry" between qualifications for the federal franchise
and those of a given state. 16 1 The Court concluded that the fun154 Id. (citing Classic, 313 U.S. at 318. See also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
659-60 (1944)). To hold that the provisions were not applicable to every stage of
the selection process, stated the Court, would subject the opportunity for free electoral choice "to the sort of erosion that these prior decisions were intended to
prevent." Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 555.
155 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 555.
I56 Id. See also supra note 35 (text of Article I, § 2).
157 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 555-56.
158 Id. The delegates to the Convention were specifically concerned that the people would not support a new Constitution which would render them ineligible to
vote. Id. at 556 (citing J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 467,
468, 471 (E. Scott ed. 1893) (hereinafter MADISON'S JOURNAL)). The Court recalled
Oliver Ellsworth's prediction that "[t]he people will not readily subscribe to a National Constitution, if it should subject them to be disenfranchised." Id. (citing
MADISON'S JOURNAL at 468).
159 Id. at 556. See THE FEDERALIST No. 52, p.354 U. Cooke ed. 1961) (reducing
different state qualifications to uniform rule would have caused problems to states
as well as Convention. Resulting provision conforms to state standards).
160 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 556.
161 Id. The Court adopted the rationale initially put forth by the Party, and which
had been succinctly summarized by the court of appeals:
The Party.. .argue[d] that Art. I, § 2 and the seventeenth amendment
should be interpreted consistent with the intentions that animated the
Framers' inclusion of the qualifications language-a compromise provision permitting suffrage to be determined by reference to state law, but
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damental purpose of both Article I, § 2 and the seventeenth
amendment is satisfied when persons qualified to vote for the
most numerous branch of their state's legislature may also vote
for federal legislative offices. 162
The majority next declared that there had been no requirement of "absolute symmetry" in past situations where federal
voter qualifications had been expanded. 16 1 It found support for
this declaration in Oregon v. Mitchell," in which the Supreme
Court held, in a plurality opinion, that the 1970 amendments to
the Voting Rights Act could constitutionally establish a minimum
age of eighteen for the federal franchise.' 65 The Mitchell Court,
however, concluded that Congress was not empowered to so
limit the age for state and local elections. 6 6 Accordingly, the
Tashjian majority found the appellant's reading of the Qualifications Clauses, requiring
absolute symmetry, to be inconsistent
67
with prior holdings.'

The Tashjian Court thus concluded that the Party Rule was
constitutional because it did not deny the federal franchise to
those who were eligible to vote for members of the Connecticut
House of Representatives. 168 Having found earlier that the
closed primary law unconstitutionally burdened the Republican
Party and its members, and the defenses asserted by the State of
Connecticut in support of the statute to be inadequate,
the ma1 69
jority affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens addressed only the
applicable provisions of Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution, and the portions of the majority opinion pertaining to the
insuring that the state could not establish stricter voting requirements
for the selection of federal representatives than they had for state legislators. Essentially, we are urged to hold that a state's qualifications
merely set the minimum standard by which federal voter requirements
in that state must be measured, rather than determine the only acceptable standard. An electoral scheme that establishes a broader franchise
for federal elections than state races would, therefore, be perfectly
permissible.
Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 272 n.l 1
(2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986).
162 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 556.
163 Id.
164 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
165 Id. at 117-18 (Black, J., plurality opinion)).
166 Id. at 124-25.
167 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 556.
168

Id.

169

Id. at 556-57.
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Qualifications Clauses. 170 He denounced the Party Rule as unconstitutional, because it created a class of voters who could participate in federal elections, while simultaneously barring them
from participation in certain state elections. 17' Like the majority,
Justice Stevens' dissent recognized that the Qualifications
Clauses applied to primaries as well as general elections. 1 72 Justice Stevens, however, criticized the majority's "freewheeling interpretation" of the plain language of the Qualifications
Clauses.173 The Justice believed that the language of the Qualifications Clauses was clear on its face and would indeed have required absolute symmetry between federal and state voter
qualifications, were it not for the Court's erroneous
interpretation. 174
In analyzing the majority's explanation of the framers' purpose, 1 75 the dissent countered that the excerpts from the framers'
debate quoted by the majority were in response to a proposed
amendment to the first Qualifications Clause, which was already
part of the draft. 176 Justice Stevens determined that since the
language quoted by the majority was amendatory, rather than
language used in formulation of the Clause, the majority's interpretation of the framers' intent was misplaced.' 7 7
Justice Stevens also found the Court's reliance on the plurality opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell to be misguided. 178 Justice Stevens emphasized that in Mitchell four Justices had found that
Congress had no power to extend the voting franchise in any respect, 1 79 while four other Justices would have permitted Con170 Justice Stevens was joined in his dissent by Justice Scalia. Id. at 557 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
171 Id. See also supra note 20 (provisions of Party Rule).
172 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 557 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941)). See supra notes 156-162 and accompanying text
for the majority's discussion of the applicability of the Qualifications Clauses to
primaries.
173 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 557 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174 Id.
175 See supra notes 156-162 and accompanying text (majority's discussion of framers' purpose in enacting Article I, § 2).
176 Id. at 558 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The proposed amendment would have
given Congress the power to prescribe electoral qualifications or to impose a property qualification upon the federal franchise. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). As explained by the majority earlier, a property qualification would have rendered many
voters who were able to participate in state elections ineligible for corresponding
federal elections. Id. at 556.
177 See id. at 557 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178 See id. at 558 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Burger andJustices Harlan, Stewart,
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gress to regulate federal, state, and local elections.1 8 0 The
dissent asserted that the various opinions of these eight Justices
were "consistent with the proposition that the Constitution requires the same qualifications for state and federal elections."''
Additionally, Justice Stevens contended that Justice Black, the
author of the Mitchell plurality, found favor with a literal reading
of the Qualifications Clauses "in the absence of a federal statute
prescribing a different rule for federal elections."' 8 2 Justice Stevens thus claimed to have found no applicable federal statute
permitting two different sets of electoral qualifications. l8 3 He
concluded his dissent by denying the existence of any justification for "the Court's refusal to honor the plain language of the
8 4
Qualifications Clauses."
Justice Scalia, in a separate dissent, discussed the Party's
right of political association as articulated by the majority.' 8 5 Justice Scalia's dissent framed the conflict as a struggle between the
right of political association afforded to the Republican Party,
and the state's authority in regulating the electoral process to assure "fair and effective party participation."'18 6 While Justice
Scalia declared that the resolution of this struggle depended
upon the facts of each particular case, 18 7 he nonetheless believed
and Blackmun held that Congress had no such power. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 152,
212-13 (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and id. at 281, 287-89
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., and
Blackmun, J.).
180 Tashjian, 107 S.Ct. at 558 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Mitchell, Justices Douglas, Brennan, White and Marshall would have allowed extension of the franchise to
both federal and state elections. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 135, 141-44 (Douglas, J.)
and id. at 229, 280-81 (joint opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.).
181 Tashjian, 107 S.Ct. at 558 (Stevens,J., dissenting). For examples of this viewpoint, see Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 210-11 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), and id. at 287-90 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
However, the opinion ofJustice Douglas and the joint opinion ofJustices Brennan,
White, and Marshall did not address the subject. Tashjian, 107 S.Ct. at 558 n.6
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
182 Tashjian, 107 S.Ct. at 559 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained
that Justice Black had relied upon Article I, § 4, which "empowers Congress to alter
a State's regulations concerning the times, places and manner of holding elections
for Senators and Representatives." Id. (citing Mitchell, 450 U.S. at 119-24) (Black,
J., plurality opinion)).
183 Id. at 559 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor joined in Justice Scalia's dissent. Id.
186 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-90 (1983); Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
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that the majority had set an undesirable precedent through its
overexpansion of first amendment restrictions upon state regulation of elections.188
Justice Scalia next opined that the Republican Party's claim
of an infringement of its associational right was exaggerated. 1 9
He declared that § 9-56 of the Connecticut General Statutes prevented the Republican Party from being restricted from recruiting and enrolling members. 190 He described the real complaint
of the Party as its inability to leave its candidate selection process
to outsiders who were unwilling to become members.' 9 ' The
Justice considered freedom of association to be a useless concept
when so liberally applied.192
Justice Scalia acknowledged the right of a party to seek and
put forth candidates capable of obtaining support from both
party members and independents. 193 He found, however, that
the state was not obligated to let its primary system be used to
further this objective.' 94 Instead, the Justice asserted that a
party-funded opinion poll could accomplish this purpose. 195
Moreover, Justice Scalia asserted that the state could insist that
the choice of independent voters be determined separately, and
then be considered by the party membership, rather than by allowing such outsiders to dilute or dominate the vote. 196
The Justice also disputed the majority's characterization of
the state's interest as an attempt to protect Party integrity against
the Party itself. 19 7 Mindful that the decision to implement the
Party Rule was made at a state convention,' 98 he expressed his
uncertainty that the decision was actually favored by the Party at
large.' 99 He continued that even if the majority of the Party's
188 Id.

189 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190 Id. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (majority's discussion of § 9-56,
which now permits unaffiliated voters to register with party until last business day
preceding primary election).
191 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Democratic Party of the United States v.
Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 130-31 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[N]ot
every conflict between state law and party rules concerning participation in the
nominating process creates a burden on associational rights.").
193 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194 Id.
'95 Id.
196 Id.

197 Id.

198 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
199 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that
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members was in favor of the Party Rule, the state is no more required to honor this desire than it would if the members wished
to abandon the primary system altogether. 200 The Justice summarized his point by exclaiming that a valid primary requirement
presupposes that the state may indeed protect a Party against itself.20 1 Connecticut, he declared, may lawfully require that "significant elements of the democratic process be democratic20 2
whether the Party wants it that way or not."
Unimpeded by constitutional and statutory provisions, the
Republican Party is now free to implement the Party Rule. The
state's interests, legitimate as they might have been, could not be
considered compelling within the context of the Connecticut
statutory scheme. The revision of § 9-56 of the Connecticut
General Statutes,20 3 for example, contradicted the state's expressed fear that raiding posed a threat to the two-party system. 2 04 Moreover, even if the statute were not in place, the
ability of a party to effectively "raid" an open primary has been
questioned.20 5 Lastly, there are less restrictive means of preventing raiding than to sustain enforcement of the closed primary
law.

20 6

Similarly, the fear of "voter confusion" did not mandate a
the convention, which made the decision to allow "ultimate selection of [the
Party's] candidates for federal and statewide office to be determined by persons
outside the Party," might have significantly different views from those of the Party
rank and file concerning the advancement of candidates faithful to the Party philosophy. Id. Justice Scalia noted that primary requirements imposed by states are supposed to protect the membership against this sort of minority control. Id. (citing
Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D. Conn.), aff'd mem., 429 U.S. 989
(1976)).
200 Id.
201 Id. The dissent further commented that the validity of a primary requirement
had previously been considered by the Court to be "too plain for argument." Id.
(citing American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974)).
202 Id. (emphasis added).
203 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
204 See Appellees' Brief at 47, Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v.
Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S.Ct. 544 (1986).
205 See Note, Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 11 11, 1173
(1975); A. Ranney, Turnout and Representation in PresidentialPrimay Elections, 66 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 21, 35-36 (1972). Traditionally, the Supreme Court has not involved
itself in the dispute over raiding. See Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 118-19 (1981) (Court defers to Party's
study of raiding).
206 Appellees' Brief, supra note 204, at 50. For example, the state could increase
the statutory period of ineligibility to vote in one party's primary after having left
the other party. It could require recently unaffiliated voters to sign a statement
under oath that they did not leave the primary for fraudulent purposes. The state
could also impose greater criminal sanctions upon those found to be voting fraudu-
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rejection of the Party Rule.2 °7 The fact that some voters may link
a political party with a particular ideology neither justifies a
state's interference with a political party's constitutionally protected associational right, nor imposes upon that party a duty to
adhere to the ideology with which it has been identified.20 '
Hence, "[n]o such remote danger [as feared by the state] can justify the immediate and crippling impact on the basic constitutional rights involved in this case."20'
The Tashjian decision is consistent with the Court's holdings
in Nader v. Schaffer and Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin
ex rel. La Follette in that independents may now take part in a primary, against the wishes of the state, but only if the party permits
them to participate.2 "' The Court did not extend the right to
freedom of political association to independent voters themselves, but to the political parties, which became the arbiters of
voter eligibility. 2 ' The Tashjian decision is thus an extension of
the collective aspect of the right of political association.2 1 2
The State of Connecticut had claimed that the Party Rule
would dilute the effect of the Republican voters upon the outcome of future party primaries, an opinion echoed by Justice
lently. Id. The Connecticut statutory provision governing fraudulent voting provides in pertinent part:
Any person not legally qualified who fraudulently votes in any town
meeting, primary or election in which he is not qualified to vote, and any
legally qualified person who, at such meeting, primary or election,
fraudulently votes more than once at the same meeting, primary or election, shall be fined not less than three hundred dollars nor [more] than
five hundred dollars and shall be imprisoned not less than one year nor
more than two years and shall be disenfranchised.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-360 (West Supp. 1987). But cf.Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F.
Supp. 837, 847 (D. Conn.), aff'd mere., 429 U.S. 989 (1976) ("Unless the deterrent
aspect of the criminal law were totally effective, such a law would apply only after
the damage had been done to the electoral process and would be in the nature of
punishment not remedy." (emphasis by the court)).
207 See supra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
208 See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 769 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Political parties in this country traditionally have been characterized by a fluidity
and overlap of philosophy and membership ....
Citizens customarily choose a party
and vote in a primary simply because it presents candidates and issues more responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations.").
209 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968).
210 See Note, supra note 48, at 120-22.
211 See id. This rationale led the Tashjian majority to reject the state's contention
that the Connecticut law permitting independents to register up until the last business day preceding the primary, see supra note 115, rendered the associational infringement de minimus. Tashjian, 107 S.Ct. at 550 n.7.
212 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

1987]

NOTES

897

Scalia in his dissent.21 3 Indeed, it may be argued that the outcome of an open primary might not be consistent with the actual
goals of a political party, and that the party's right to determine
the consensus of its members may thus be compromised to some
degree.2 14 It is therefore noteworthy that, in Connecticut, statutes other than the closed primary law act to preserve the inherent "Republican" identity of the Party once the Party Rule is
implemented. 2 5 The input of party adherents into the selection
of the candidates is thus preserved, and the participation of unaffiliated voters ensures that the candidate with the greatest likelihood of bipartisan support emerges from the primary
victoriously.216
The Tashjian decision demonstrates the peculiar problems
that arise when considering state interests in the context of partisan politics. 2 17 In such cases, the holders of positions in state

government do so by means of the very system that they seek to
regulate. Arguments advanced on behalf of "the state" can be
deceptive because they necessarily parallel the viewpoint of a
particular party. In the court of appeals, Judge Kaufman had determined that the state's control of its electoral process through
§ 9-431 had the effect of enabling one party to maintain a dominant position in state government.21 8 Judge Kaufman further reflected upon the unsuccessful attempts by the Republican Party
213 Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief at 20, Republican Party of the State of
Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986).
The state argued that individual Democratic votes would have proportionately
greater significance than corresponding Republican votes for those offices covered
by the Rule, and that Republican votes would also be diluted as compared to the
votes of registered members of both parties for those offices not covered by the
Party Rule. Id.
214 See Note, supra note 48, at 128 n.54.
215 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-372, et seq. (West Supp. 1987). Under these
state rules, a candidate who wishes to be placed on the Republican Party ballot is
required both to be a registered voter with the party, and to receive at least 20% of
the vote at the Republican nominating convention. Id. Delegates to the convention, as well as those who select them, must be members of the Republican Party.
Id.
216 See Appellees' Brief, supra note 204, at 42. Unaffiliated voters may now contribute to the candidate selection process to an unprecedented degree, as there
have only been statewide primaries in Connecticut since 1970. For a long time,
Connecticut's political machines used conventions for the nomination of both
statewide and congressional candidates. These outdated mechanisms did not encourage "uncontrollable" voters to partake in the relatively few primaries then in
existence. M. BARONE & G. UJIFUSA, supra note 15, at 236.
217 See Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 554 (views of state represent, to some extent, those
of party presently in majority).
218 Republican Party of the State of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 282
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to implement the Party Rule, which were repeatedly obstructed
by the Democratic majority in the state legislature and the governor's office, thus having the effect of regulating the structure of
the State's Republican organization. 219 The court below thought
that these events, at the very least, suggested an attempt by a
temporary majority to prolong its stay in power, ensure protection against challenges from its rival party, and isolate itself from
accountability to the general public.220
The merit of the Tashjian decision is somewhat offset by the
manner in which the Court disposed of the constitutional challenge to the Party Rule. In refuting the state's argument that the
Qualifications Clauses required absolute symmetry between state
and federal voter qualifications, the Court did not address several
of its earlier proclamations to the contrary. 22 ' Upon close inspection, the opinion of the Court in Oregon v. Mitchell-the only
decision relied upon by the Tashjian majority in its interpretation
of the Qualifications Clauses-does not support the Tashjian
Court's rationale, suggesting instead that absolute symmetry is
(2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986). The appellate court had urged that § 9431 prevented the Party from making itself more politically competitive. Id.
219 Id. at 283.
220 Id. "(P]ermitting a government with partisan ties arising from the electoral
campaign to govern the structure of the party out of power threatens to reduce [the
latter's] ability to offer the public an alternative." Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note
142, at 16. After all, the "primary function of a political party is the direction and
control of the struggle for political power among men who may have contradictory
interests and often mutually exclusive hopes of securing them." Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, 287 F. Supp. 794, 805 (D. Minn.), aff'd,
399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
221 The Court described the operation of the qualifications provision in Ex Parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884):
The States in prescribing the qualifications of voters for the most numerous branch of their own legislatures, do not do this with reference to
the election for members of Congress. Nor can they prescribe the qualification for voters for those eo nomine. They define who are to vote for
the popular branch of their own legislature, and the Constitution of the
United States says the same persons shall vote for members of Congress
in that State. It adopts the qualification thus furnished as the qualification of its own electors for members of Congress.
Id. at 663. This declaration has found support in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966):
Under the distribution of powers effected by the Constitution, the States
establish qualifications for voting for state officers, and the qualifications
established by the States for voting for members of the most numerous
branch of the state legislature also determine who may vote for United
States Representatives and Senators.
Id. at 647 (citations omitted).
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required unless Congress directs otherwise.
In a broader
sense, the disagreement between the majority and the dissent on
the reading of the Qualifications Clauses exemplifies the
Supreme Court's lack of consensus as to how literally the terms
of the United States Constitution are to be read. 223
In rejecting the constitutional challenge to the specific provisions of the Party Rule, the majority expanded the scope of the
right to freedom of political association beyond a party's mere
right to choose between an open or closed primary. In doing so,
however, the Court established no future guidelines for ascertaining acceptability of newly-drawn party rules. As the Tashjian
decision calls into question the structure of the primary systems
of thirty-six other states, 224 this extension of the right to freedom
of political association may open the floodgates for more litigation-specifically, challenges to closed primary laws, challenges
to other variations of party rules, and calls for a settled interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses.
222 See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 125 (Black, J., plurality opinion). Addressing the first
Qualifications Clause, Justice Black stated that
Art. I, § 2, is a clear indication that the Framers intended the States to
determine the qualifications of their own voters for state offices, because
those qualifications were adopted for federal offices unless Congress directs otherwise under Art. I, § 4.
Id. The ability of a state political party to so direct otherwise was not addressed.
223 In Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. N.E.C.A., Inc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987),
this "difficult question" was considered:
[W]hen is the rule of law to be found in the words (plus their structure
and history), and when are the words just evidence of the "real" rule,
which is to be teased out of the purposes of those who wrote and approved the rule and their expectation about the rule's consequences?
Questions of this sort continue to divide the Supreme Court (citing
Tashjian).
Id. at 364-65.
224 Tashjian, 107 S. Ct. at 553 n.11. At the time of the opinion, 20 states besides
Connecticut had a classical "closed" primary, requiring participants to have been a
member of the party for some duration of time: Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
Sixteen states allowed a voter, with no prior affiliation with a party, to vote in
the party primary, if registering at that time or for that purpose: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Texas. Id. The Tashjian decision would impact only these 36 states. Id.
Four states had non-partisan primaries, allowing all registered voters to take
part: Alaska, Louisiana, Virginia, and Washington. Id.
Lastly, 9 states had classic "open" primaries, permitting registered voters to
choose a party primary in which to vote: Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id.
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The Tashjian decision clearly established that the first
amendment right of freedom of political association protects
rules that a state political party wishes to enact, provided that
such rules are otherwise constitutional. While such rules may, as
in this case, lend a degree of transiency to the voter rolls of a
given party, they are preferable to the alternative: the allowance
of a political party to use electoral victories to its advantage by
taking steps to ensure self-succession, under the guise of the "interests of the state." Yet by deciding to validate the Party Rule,
while contravening its traditional analysis of the Qualifications
Clauses, the Tashjian majority compromised the precedential
value of its holding. To have merely established a state party's
right to choose between open and closed primaries would have
been a more reasonable and potentially enduring legacy of the
Tashjian Court.
William M. Hunt

